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Minnesota's Anti-Stalking Statute: A




Justice Louis Brandeis identified the "right to be left alone as
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-
lized men."1 The author agrees and sees well drafted anti-stalking
legislation as the most effective tool to protect citizens from the ter-
rorism of stalkers' conduct.
This article highlights the need for anti-stalking laws and de-
termines that they can be drafted to withstand constitutional chal-
lenges. Section I discusses the reasons why effective anti-stalking
legislation is urgently needed. Section II explores the history and
development of anti-stalking laws, including proposed recommen-
dations for effective legislation and pioneer legislation. It also dis-
cusses the ineffectiveness of other criminal statutes in addressing
the crime of stalking. Section III compares Minnesota's anti-stalk-
ing law to pioneer legislation, addresses the impact of the Minne-
sota law, and analyzes the Minnesota anti-stalking statute from a
constitutional standpoint. This article concludes that Minnesota's
anti-stalking statute is much needed and that the law is
constitutional.2
* J.D. expected May 1995, University of Minnesota Law School. MA in Public
Administration, 1991, Troy State University. BA, Cum Laude, in Journalism, 1987,
Howard University. Captain, U.S. Army Military Police Corps. The author wishes
to thank Madeline T. Ward, (W.A.C.) for her love and guidance. The author also
wishes to thank Thomas R. Ward, Esquire and Damon L. Ward, Esquire for their
support and encouragement. "Never Say Die!"
1. 138 CONG. REC. S13,469-02 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Cohen).
2. Stalking and legislation dealing with such behavior influences debate in nu-
merous arenas. Both sides of the heated abortion debate have utilized the stalking
legislation to thwart the oppositions' efforts to uncover secret plans. Also, since
stalking is perpetrated mostly by men, this has become a hot topic with womens'
rights groups. These areas and other tangential areas are beyond the scope of this
article. This article sets forth a means for drafting constitutional and effective anti-
stalking legislation.
Law and Inequality
I. Recognizing the Need for Effective Anti-Stalking
Legislation
Stalking victims suffer from repeated and insidious harass-
ment, that harassment laws are not equipped to address. By enact-
ing separate anti-stalking statutes, state legislatures acknowledge
the fact that stalking is not the same as harassment and that pen-
alties for stalking should be more severe. 3 Actresses, novelists, and
talk show hosts are not the only people being menaced by stalkers.4
The majority of stalking cases involve females as the targets with
former spouses or lovers as the perpetrators. 5 According to the
FBI, about 200,000 people, most of them women, are harassed by
stalkers each year in the United States.6 In fact, about five percent
of women will be victimized by stalkers during their lifetime.7
The National Women's Abuse Center estimates that four mil-
lion men violently attack, abuse, or kill women they live with or
date.8 Nearly one third of all women killed in America are mur-
dered by their husbands or boyfriends.9 As many as ninety percent
of those women were stalked.1o Also, based on studies of large met-
ropolitan cities, the Seattle Times reported that ninety percent of
all women murdered by their partners notified police at least once
of threats against them, and over half of these victims had called
five times or more.ll
Lack of effective or applicable laws, ineffectiveness of re-
straining orders, and increased public awareness of criminal acts by
stalkers have given rise to the need for anti-stalking legislation.12
Citizens are subjected to harassment and threat of physical harm
as anti-abortion protestors blockade medical services clinics and fol-
3. Kathleen G. McAnaney et al., Note, From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalk-
ing Laws, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 819, 883 (1993). Harassment, intimidation,
threats, trespass, and loitering laws only partially, and inadequately address stalk-
ing behaviors, whereas anti-stalking statutes impose heavier penalties for repeat
offenses against the same victim. Id.
4. Christina Perez, Note, Stalking: When Does Obsession Become a Crime?, 20
AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 268-70 (1993); see also 138 Cong. Rec. S13469-02 (daily ed. Sep-
tember 15, 1992) (Statement of Sen. Cohen).
5. Melinda Beck et al., Murderous Obsession, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1992, at 61.
6. Nina Schuyler, No Place to Hide, CAL. LAW., June 1993, at 18.
7. Maria Puente, Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking, USA TODAY, July
21 1992, at 9A.
8. 138 CONG. REC. S10,314-01 (daily ed., July 27, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
9. Beck et al., supra note 5, at 61.
10. Id.
11. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 8.
12. Id.
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low and threaten health care workers as they try to enter.13 Clinics
are also bombed, vandalized and set on fire.14 The facilities are
sprayed with butyric acid, a substance so foul smelling that those
inside are forced to evacuate.15 In addition, physicians' homes are
picketed by anti-abortion demonstrators, and their names and ad-
dresses publicized on wanted posters. The lives of physicians' and
their families are threatened.16 Recently, a physician was even
shot and killed outside the clinic he was about to enter.' 7
Other tragic examples of stalkers killing their victims high-
light the need for effective anti-stalking legislation. In one incident
in 1982, eleven-year-old Caty Thayer was repeatedly raped and
then murdered in Vermont after being stalked by a stranger for
nineteen months, during which time the police did nothing.IS In
another incident in 1992, Kristen Lardner, a twenty-one-year-old
budding artist was shot to death in a Boston street by her ex-boy-
friend against whom she had obtained a restraining order.19
II. History of Legislating the Crime of Stalking
A. Development of Anti-Stalking Legislation Guidelines at
the National Level
Since 1990, in response to growing attention to the crime of
stalking, state legislatures have raced to develop criminal sanctions
specifically addressing that crime. 20 In July 1992, Senator William
S. Cohen introduced a bill to assist the states in the enactment of
legislation to address the criminal act of stalking other persons. 21
Senator Cohen felt that the responsibility for enacting and enforc-
ing anti-stalking legislation should remain in the hands of the
states.22 However, he was concerned that states might write their
anti-stalking statutes either too narrowly, rendering them essen-
tially meaningless, or too broadly, making them unconstitutional.23
Senator Cohen's bill, as passed, instructed the National Institute of
Justice (NIJ), the Federal Government's principal criminal justice






18. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 4.
19. Colman McCarthy, Better Protection for Women in Danger, WASH. POST,
June 13, 1992, at A21.
20. Id.




research and development agency, to evaluate anti-stalking legisla-
tion and proposed anti-stalking legislation in the states; develop
model anti-stalking legislation that is constitutional and enforcea-
ble; prepare and disseminate its findings to state authorities; and
report to Congress its findings and the need or appropriateness of
further action by the Federal government by September 30, 1993.24
On October 4, 1993, Senator Cohen announced the completion
of the NIJ study which recommended that the states do the follow-
ing: (1) establish a continuum of charges that could be used by law
enforcement officials to intervene at various stages of a stalking sit-
uation, while less egregious cases could be handled under existing
harassment or intimidation statutes; (2) enact aggravated harass-
ment or intimidation statutes to be used when a defendant persist-
ently engages in annoying behavior; and (3) create a stalking felony
to allow enforcement officials to intervene and address serious, per-
sistent, and obsessive behavior that causes a victim to fear bodily
injury or death.25 The NIJ did not list specific types of actions that
could be construed as stalking because some courts have ruled that
if a statute includes a specific list of prohibited acts, the list is ex-
clusive.2 6 Rather, the report's statutory recommendations seek to
prevent stalkers from engaging in a course of conduct that would
cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm or death.2 7 Although
enacted before the completion of the NIJ report, California's
groundbreaking anti-stalking law may also be considered a useful
reference by states in the process of drafting or amending their
anti-stalking statutes.
B. California's Anti-Stalking Statute
Since 1990, 48 states have enacted anti-stalking laws.28 Cali-
fornia enacted the first anti-stalking law and amended it in 1992
and 1993.29 Even with the 1992 amendment to the pioneer legisla-
24. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-395, § 109(b), 106 Stat. 1828,
1842 (1992).
25. 139 CONG. REC. S12,901-01 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 139 CONG. REC., supra note 25.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993).
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or ha-
rasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent
to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the
safety of his or her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking,
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year
or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both
that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
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tion,30 California's district attorneys and stalking victims com-
(b) Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary
restraining order, injunction, or any other court order in effect prohibit-
ing the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or
four years.
(c) Every person who, having been convicted of a felony under this sec-
tion, commits a second or subsequent violation of this section shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four
years.
(d) For the purposes of this section, "harasses" means a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously
alarms, annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and which serves no
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause
a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must
actually cause substantial emotional distress to the person. "Course of
conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Con-
stitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of
"course of conduct."
(e) For the purposes of this section, "credible threat" means a verbal or
written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combina-
tion of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent
and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the per-
son who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her
safety or the safety of his or her immediate family.
(f) This section shall not apply to conduct which occurs during labor
picketing.
(g) If probation is granted, or the execution or imposition of a sentence
is suspended, for any person convicted under this section, it shall be a
condition of probation that the person participate in counseling, as des-
ignated by the court. However, the court, upon a showing of good cause,
may find that the counseling requirement shall not be imposed.
(h) The court shall also consider issuing an order restraining the de-
fendant from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for up to 10
years, as determined by the court. It is the intent of the legislature that
the length of any restraining order be based upon the seriousness of the
facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the
safety of the victim and his or her immediate family. The duration of
the restraining order may be longer than five years only in an extreme
case, where a longer duration is necessary to protect the safety of the
victim or his or her immediate family.
(i) For purposes of this section, "immediate family" means any spouse,
parent, child, any person related by consanguinity or affinity within the
second degree, or any other person who regularly resides in the house-
hold, or who, within the prior six months, regularly resided in the
household.
(j) The court shall consider whether the defendant would benefit from
treatment pursuant to Section 2684. If it is determined to be appropri-
ate, the court shall recommend that the Department of Corrections
make a certification as provided in Section 2684. Upon the certifica-
tion, the defendant shall be evaluated and transferred to the appropri-
ate hospital for treatment pursuant to Section 2684.
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West 1992).
(a) Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or ha-
rasses another person and who makes a credible threat with the intent
to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury or
to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury of
his or her immediate family is guilty of the crime of stalking, punish-
able by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or by a
Law and Inequality
plained that under the law's 1992 terms a first time offender who
did not violate an injunction or temporary restraining order could
only be charged with a misdemeanor and that it was difficult to get
a conviction.31 Further, under the statute's 1992 definition of
fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine
and imprisonment.
(b) Any person who violates subdivision (a) when there is a temporary
restraining order, injunction, or ariy other court order in effect prohibit-
ing the behavior described in subdivision (a) against the same party, is
punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year
or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both
that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison.
(c) A second or subsequent conviction occurring within seven years of a
prior conviction under subdivision (a) against the same victim, and in-
volving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of violence, as defined in
subdivision (f), is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not
more than one year, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars
($1,000), or by both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in
the state prison.
(d) Every person who, having been convicted of a felony under this sec-
tion, commits a second or subsequent violation of this section against
the same victim and involving an act of violence or "a credible threat" of
violence, as defined in subdivision (f), is punishable in the state prison,
for 16 months, two or three years and a fine up to ten thousand dollars
($10,000).
(e) For the purposes of this section, "harasses means a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously
alarms, annoys, harasses, or terrorizes the person, and which serves no
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause
a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must
actually cause substantial emotional distress to the person. "Course of
conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Con-
stitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of
"course of conduct."
(f) For the purposes of this section, "a credible threat" means a threat
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so
as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear
for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family. The
threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause great bodily in-
jury to, a person as defined in Section 12022.7.
(g) This section shall not apply to conduct which occurs during labor
picketing.
(h) If probation is granted, or the execution or imposition of a sentence
is suspended, for any person convicted under this section, it shall be a
condition of probation that the person participate in counseling, as des-
ignated by the court. However, the court, upon a showing of good cause,
may find that the counseling requirement shall not be imposed.
(i) The court shall also consider issuing an order restraining the de-
fendant from any contact with the victim, that may be valid for up to 10
years, as determined by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature
that the length of any restraining order be based upon the seriousness
of the facts before the court, the probability of future violations, and the
safety of the victim and his or her immediate family. The duration of
the restraining order may be longer than five years only in an extreme
case, where a longer duration is necessary to protect the safety of the
victim or his or her immediate family.
31. Schuyler, supra note 6, at 18.
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"credible threat,"32 which is required before law enforcement of-
ficers can go after a stalker, prosecutors often had to wait for an
actual attack before prosecuting. 33
With the 1992 amendment of the statute, a first offense gener-
ally was punishable as a misdemeanor, and the offender could be
imprisoned in county jail for not more than one year, punished by a
fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or be fined and
imprisoned. 3 4 Under the 1993 revision, stalking in California is
punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony, and allows a convicted
stalker to be sentenced to the state prison, even if the person has
not also violated a temporary restraining order, injunction, or other
court order.3 5
The 1993 language subjects a person found guilty of violating
a temporary restraining order, an injunction, or any other court or-
der, to a felony conviction punishable by imprisonment in state
prison for two, three, or four years.3 6 The 1992 language, in con-
trast, made it possible to charge the crime as a misdemeanor or a
felony if the stalker violated a temporary restraining order, an in-
junction, or both.37 However, the imposed sentence still could not
exceed one year.38
The 1993 statute also redefined "credible threat" and "ha-
rasses."3 9 Previously, "credible threat" meant a threat made with
the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to
cause the targeted person to reasonably fear for his or her safety or
that of his or her immediate family.4O "Credible threat" now means
"a verbal or written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of con-
duct or a combination of verbal or written statements and conduct
made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the
threat so as to cause the targeted person to reasonably fear for his
or her safety or that of his or her family."41 Also, for purposes of the
statute, "harasses" previously meant "a knowing and willful course
of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously harms, an-
noys, harasses, or terrorizes the person and which serves no legiti-
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (f) (West 1992).
33. Schuyler, supra note 6, at 18.
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West 1992).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(b) (West Supp. 1993).
37. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(b) (West 1992).
38. Id.
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West Supp. 1993).
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(f) (West 1992).
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West Supp. 1993).
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mate purpose."42 The 1993 amendment defines "harass" as
"torment."
4 3
Under the 1993 statutory definition, "any person who will-
fully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another per-
son and who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that
person or his or her immediate family in reasonable fear . . .is
guilty of the crime of stalking, punishable by imprisonment.... ."44
The statute, as amended, requires that an accused stalker "act with
the intent to place a person or his or her immediate family in rea-
sonable fear for their safety."45 Previously, the law required an in-
tent to place a victim or his or her immediate family in a reasonable
fear of death or great bodily harm. 46
The 1993 amendments also changed the requirement that a
person previously convicted under the statute must commit a sec-
ond or subsequent violation involving an act of violence or credible
threat of violence against the same person in order to subject the
stalker to a possible sentence to the state prison.4 7 Now, every per-
son who has been convicted of a felony under the statute, shall be
punished for second or subsequent offenses, against either the same
or a different person, by imprisonment in the state prison for two,
three, or four years. 48 Along with stiffer sentences, however, the
statute provides for mental health evaluation and treatment for
persons convicted under its terms.
Before the 1993 amendment of the anti-stalking statute, Cali-
fornia's criminal code authorized the Director of Corrections to cer-
tify to the Director of the State Department of Mental Health, that
a mentally deficient or insane person convicted under the anti-
stalking statute and confined in a state prison should receive treat-
ment at a state hospital.49 The legislature added this provision to
the state's amended anti-stalking statute, requiring that the court
determine whether a defendant convicted under the anti-stalking
law would benefit from treatment and placement in a state hospi-
tal.5 0 Upon such a determination, the court must recommend that
the Department of Corrections certify the stalker's mental defi-
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(f) (West 1992).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1993).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West 1992).
47. Id.
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(c) (West Supp. 1993).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2684 (West 1992).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(j) (West Supp. 1993).
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ciency and or insanity to the Department of Mental Health, and
initiate placement in a state hospital for treatment.5 1
The 1992 and 1993 amendments appear to make California's
anti-stalking law a more effective tool against stalkers. Califor-
nia's public defenders and the American Civil Liberties Union, how-
ever, opposed these amendments.52 They felt that the 1993 statute,
as amended, would be unconstitutionally broad.53 For instance,
they feared that the changes would allow the arrest of harmless,
mentally incompetent defendants. 54
Although an individual's rights and freedoms of expression,
travel, and movement must be protected, we ought not tolerate sit-
uations in which a person is allowed to place another individual or
that person's family in fear of physical or emotional harm.5 5 States
must not go so far with anti-stalking legislation as to improperly
restrict the rights of law abiding citizens to engage in generally
legal activities. 56 It is imperative that anti-stalking legislation pro-
hibit the use of ordinary behavior to terrorize. 5 7 These are some of
the dilemmas legislators face in drafting anti-stalking statutes.
C. Criminal Provisions That Could Be Used to Address
Stalking in Minnesota
Prior to the passage of Minnesota's anti-stalking legislation,
victims of actions that could be considered part of stalking activities
could seek protection and remedies using other criminal statutes.
These statutes do not directly address the specific crime of stalking.
However, they do sanction some actions that stalkers could use to
cause another person to feel oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated.
1. Domestic Abuse Act
Under Minnesota's Domestic Abuse Act, any family or house-
hold member may seek protection from the court personally or on
behalf of a minor family or household member.5 8 The petitioner
51. Id.
52. Schuyler, supra note 6, at 20.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 139 CONG. REc., supra note 25.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01 (West Supp. 1993). Pertinent subdivisions are herein
outlined:
Subd. 2. Definitions. As used in this section, the following terms shall
have the meanings given them:
(a) "Domestic abuse" means (i) physical harm, bodily injury, as-
sault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily
622 Law and Inequality [Vol. 12:613
injury or assault, between family or household members; or (ii)
criminal sexual conduct... committed against a minor family or
household member by an adult family or household member.
(b) "Family or household members" means spouses, former
spouses, parents, and children, persons related by blood, and per-
sons who are presently residing together or who have resided to-
gether in the past, and persons who have a child in common
regardless of whether they have been married or have lived to-
gether at any time. "Family or household member" also includes
a man and woman if the woman is pregnant and the man is al-
leged to be the father, regardless of whether they have been mar-
ried or have lived together at any time. Issuance of an order for
protection on this ground does not affect a determination of pa-
ternity ....
Subd. 4. Order for protection. There shall exist an action known as a
petition for an order for protection in cases of domestic abuse.
(a) A petition for relief under this section may be made by any
family or household member personally or on behalf of minor
family or household members.
(b) A petition for relief shall allege the existence of domestic
abuse, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath
stating the specific facts and circumstances from which relief is
sought.
Subd. 6. Relief by the court.
(a) Upon notice and hearing, the court may provide relief as
follows:
(1) restrain the abusing party from committing acts of do-
mestic abuse;
(2) exclude the abusing party from the dwelling which the
parties share or from the residence of the petitioner...
(8) exclude the abusing party from the place of employ-
ment of the petitioner or otherwise limit access to the peti-
tioner by the abusing party at the petitioner's place of
employment ....
(9) Any relief granted by the order for protection shall be
for a fixed period not to exceed one year, except when the
court determines a longer fixed period is appropriate ....
Subd. 7. Temporary order.
(a) Where an application under this section alleges an immedi-
ate and present danger of domestic abuse, the court may grant
an ex parte temporary order for protection, pending a full hear-
ing, and granting relief as the court deems proper, including an
order:
(1) restraining the abusing party from committing acts of
domestic abuse;
(2) excluding any party from the dwelling they share or
from the residence of the other except by further order of
the court; and
(3) excluding the abusing party from the place of employ-
ment of the petitioner or otherwise limiting access to the
petitioner by the abusing party at the petitioner's place of
employment ....
(c) An ex parte temporary order for protection shall be effective
for a fixed period not to exceed 14 days, except for good cause as
provided under paragraph (d). A full hearing, as provided by this
section, shall be set for not later than seven days from the issu-
ance of the temporary order. The respondent shall be served
1994] MINNESOTA'S ANTI-STALKING STATUTE 623
must allege, under oath, that the offending party has engaged in
domestic abuse. The Act defines domestic abuse as physical harm,
bodily injury, assault or the infliction of fear of imminent physical
harm, bodily injury or assault.59 The court may provide relief in
the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which excludes the
abusing party from the parties' shared dwelling, or from petitioner's
residence or place of employment, until a hearing is held to deter-
mine if a longer-term order will be issued.60
The ability to use this statute to combat stalking is somewhat
limited. First, the Act can only be enlisted to restrain a person re-
lated by blood or marriage, a person who has shared a dwelling
with the victim, or a person who has a child in common with the
petitioner.6 1 Therefore, a stalker who is a stranger to or merely an
forthwith a copy of the ex parte order along with a copy of the
petition and notice of the date set for the hearing.
(d) When service is made by published notice,... the petitioner
may apply for an extension of the period of the ex parte order
.... The court may extend the ex parte temporary order for an
additional period not to exceed 14 days. The respondent shall be
served forthwith a copy of the modified ex parte order along with
a copy of the notice of the new date set for the hearing.
Subd. 13. Copy to law enforcement agency.
(a) An order for protection granted pursuant to this section shall
be forwarded by the court administrator within 24 hours to the
local law enforcement agency with jurisdiction over the residence
of the applicant
Subd. 14. Violation of an order for protection.
(a) Whenever an order for protection is granted pursuant to this
section, and the respondent or person to be restrained knows of
the order, violation of the order for protection is a misdemeanor.
Upon conviction, the defendant must be sentenced to a minimum
of three days imprisonment and must be ordered to participate in
counseling or other appropriate programs selected by the court.
If the court stays imposition or execution of the jail sentence and
the defendant refuses or fails to comply with the court's treat-
ment order, the court must impose and execute the stayed jail
sentence. A person who violates this paragraph within two years
after a previous conviction.. . or within two years after a previ-
ous conviction under a similar law of another state, is guilty of a
gross misdemeanor. Upon conviction, the defendant must be
sentenced to a minimum of ten days imprisonment and must be
ordered to participate in counseling or other appropriate pro-
gram selected by the court ....
(b) A peace officer shall arrest without a warrant and take into
custody a person whom the peace officer has probable cause to
believe has violated an order granted pursuant to this section re-
straining the person or excluding the person from the residence
or the petitioner's place of employment, even if the violation of
the order did not take place in the presence of the peace officer, if
the existence of the order can be verified by the officer ....
(c) A violation of an order for protection shall also constitute con-
tempt of court and be subject to the penalties therefor.
59. MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01 Subds. 2(a) & 4(b)(West Supp. 1993).
60. MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01 Subd. 7 (West Supp. 1993).
61. MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01 Subd. 2(b) (West Supp. 1993).
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acquaintance of the victim is not subject to the penalties of the Act.
Second, if the court decides that there is a basis for issuing a TRO,
it is only effective for fourteen days, with the possibility of a four-
teen day extension.6 2 If, after a required hearing within seven days
of issuing a TRO, the court decides not to issue a permanent order,
the victim will be left unprotected after the TRO expires or will
have to continue to seek restraining orders against the offender.6 3
Third, the penalties for violating a restraining order under the
Act are minimal in comparison to the physical, mental, or emo-
tional harm that a stalker could inflict on a victim in the course of
that violation.64 A first-time violator is subject to a misdemeanor
charge and if convicted, faces a minimum of three days imprison-
ment and mandatory counseling.6 5 However, the court has the dis-
cretion to stay imposition or execution of the jail sentence. 66
Furthermore, even with the imposition and execution of the maxi-
mum possible sentence of ninety days, a stalker would be free to
terrorize his victim after this relatively short period of time. Also,
there is no guarantee that mandatory counseling would deter a
stalker.
A repeat violator is not likely to be much more deterred by
sanctions under the Act. A person convicted of violating a re-
straining order under the Act within two years after a conviction
under the Act or under a similar law of another state must be sen-
tenced to a minimum of ten days imprisonment and must be or-
dered to participate in counseling or other appropriate program
selected by the court.6 7 However, the maximum jail time the of-
fender receives still does not exceed one year. Therefore, a stalker
who is a family or household member is not likely to be deterred by
the penalties that may be imposed under this Act. Other laws, such
as assault statutes may provide a more effective means to prosecute
stalkers.
2. Assault Statutes
Under Minnesota law, assault is an act done with the intent to
cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death or the in-
tentional infliction of or attempt to inflict bodily harm upon an-
62. Id.
63. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 Subd. 7(c) (West Supp. 1993).
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other.6 8 Whoever assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm
commits first degree assault under Minnesota Statute section
609.221, and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than
twenty years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or
both.69 A person commits second degree assault under Minnesota
Statute section 609.222 if he assaults another with a dangerous
weapon, and may be sentenced for up to seven years or fined up to
$14,000, or both.70 If the offender inflicts substantial bodily harm,
he may be sentenced to a maximum of ten years or fine of $20,000,
or both.71
According to section 609.224, whoever commits an act with the
intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or death
or who intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon
another is guilty of fifth degree assault, a misdemeanor. 72 Further,
a person who is convicted under the statute for committing the
above acts against the same victim within five years of a previous
conviction under the statute may be sentenced to imprisonment for
up to one year or a fine of up to $3,000 or both.73 It appears that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to sanction a stalker under any
of these statutes if he merely makes himself present where the vic-
tim lives or works, without saying anything to or taking or attempt-
ing to take any action against the victim. Therefore, until a stalker
violently attacks or attempts to violently attack the victim, assault
statutes provide ineffective protection against stalkers. Trespass
statutes, however, might provide a means for police to take action
against stalkers before they inflict bodily harm upon their victims.
3. Trespass Statutes
Under Minnesota Statute section 609.605, a person commits a
misdemeanor trespass violation who returns to the property of an-
other to harass, abuse, or threaten another, after being told to leave
the property and not to return.74 This statute is violated if the ac-
68. MiNN. STAT. § 609.02 (West 1992) (defining terms related to assault
statutes).
69. MiNN. STAT. § 609.221 (West Supp. 1993) ("Great bodily harm" in context of
first-degree assault is that which creates a high probability of death, causes 'serious
permanent disfigurement,' or causes a permanent or protracted loss of impairment
of function of any bodily member or organ or "other serious bodily harm").
70. MiNN. STAT. § 609.215 (West Supp. 1993).
71. Id.
72. MiNN. STAT. § 609.224 (West 1992).
73. Id.
74. MiNN. STAT. § 609.605 (West 1992). Pertinent provisions are herein outlined:
Subdivision 1. Misdemeanor.
(a) The following terms have the meanings given them for pur-
poses of this section.
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tor is, "without claim of right to the property or consent of one with
authority to consent; trespasses on the premises of another, and
without claim of right, refuses to leave upon the demand of the law-
ful possessor; or occupies or enters another's dwelling without claim
of right or consent of the owner or who has the right to give consent,
except in an emergency . . . ."75 This statute might be effective
against a person stalking his victim at her home, unless the stalker
is a spouse who has an unrestricted interest in the property entered
upon. Furthermore, this statute probably would not be effective
against a person stalking his victim at her workplace, unless the
employer pressed charges, or unless the stalking activities took
place in public. The statute appears to be mainly concerned with
protecting property interests, although it alludes to the possible
harm that the actor, by his intrusion could cause to the victim. A
more effective means to combat stalking may be the use of terroris-
(i) "Premises" means real property and any appurtenant
building or structure.
(ii) "Dwelling" means the building or part of a building
used by an individual as a place of residence on either a
full-time or a part-time basis. A dwelling may be part of a
multidwelling or multipurpose building, or a manufac-
tured home ....
(b) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if the person
intentionally:
(3) trespasses on the premises of another and, without
claim of right, refuses to depart from the premises on de-
mand of the lawful possessor;
(4) occupies or enters the dwelling of another, without
claim of right or consent of the owner or the consent of one
who has the right to give consent, except in an emergency
situation;
(7) returns to the property of another with the intent to
harass, abuse, or threaten another, after being told to
leave the property and not to return, if the actor is without
claim of right to the property or consent of one with au-
thority to consent.
Subd. 2. Gross misdemeanor. Whoever trespasses upon the grounds of
a facility providing emergency shelter services for battered women,...
or of a facility providing transitional housing for battered women and
their children, without claim of right or consent of one who has right to
give consent, and refuses to depart from the grounds of the facility on
demand of one who has right to give consent, is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor.
Subd. 3. Trespasses motivated by bias. Whoever commits an act de-
scribed in subdivision 1, clause (7), because of the property owner's or
another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, disability.... age, or national origin may be sentenced to impris-
onment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more
than $3,000, or both.
75. MINN. STAT. § 609.605, Subd. 1(b) (West 1992).
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tic threat statutes, which deal directly with explicit and implicit
threats stalkers make toward their victims.
4. Terroristic Threats Statutes
Under Minnesota Statute section 609.713, "whoever threat-
ens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with the
purpose to terrorize another ... or in a reckless disregard of the
risk of causing such terror or inconvenience, may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than five years."76 This provision could
be potentially effective in prosecuting a stalker who makes threat-
ening statements or commits threatening acts against a victim.
However, this statute is difficult to use because it requires proof
that the offender meant to express a purpose or intent to injure the
person, property, or rights of the victim by commission of an unlaw-
ful act. 77 It would be difficult to prove the crime against a stalker
who commits a lawful act such as walking or standing near where
the victim walks or is located or who only says to his victim, "I love
you," or "You belong to me." However, public nuisance laws could
be a useful means to address such insidious stalking activities.
76. MiNN. STAT. § 609.713 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
Terroristic Threats
Subdivision 1. Whoever threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any
crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacua-
tion of a building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation
or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disre-
gard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience may be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for not more than five year§
Subd. 2. Whoever communicates to another with purpose to terrorize
another or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror, that
explosives or an explosive device or any incendiary devise is present at
a named place or location, whether or not the same is in fact present,
may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three year§
Subd. 3. (a) Whoever displays, exhibits, brandishes, or otherwise em-
ploys a replica firearm in a threatening manner, may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than one year and one day or to payment of
a fine of not more than $3,000, or both, if, in doing so, the person either:
(1) causes or attempts to cause terror in another person; or
(2) acts in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror in an-
other person.
(b) For purposes of this subdivision, "replica firearm"
means a device or object that is not defined as a dangerous
weapon, and that is a facsimile or toy version of, and rea-
sonably appears to be a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off




5. Public Nuisance Statutes
Minnesota Statute section 609.746 addresses many of the ac-
tivities that could be characterized as attributable to stalkers.78 It
provides that, a person is guilty of a misdemeanor, who, "with the
intent to harass, abuse, or threaten another, repeatedly follows or
pursues another after being told not to do so by the person being
followed or pursued."79 Also, a person who, "enters upon another's
property or surreptitiously gazes, stares, or peeps in the window of
a house or dwelling of another with the intent to intrude upon or
interfere with the privacy of a member of the household" is guilty of
a misdemeanor under the statute.8 0 Because this statute seems
mainly geared toward privacy concerns rather than the potential
harm that stalkers inflict upon their victims, it probably would not
be very effective in addressing the crime of stalking, although it
does prohibit acts stalkers might engage in. A harassment statute
would likely provide a more effective tool to address repeated, un-
wanted behaviors displayed by stalkers because the prohibition ad-
dresses the psychological or emotional impact of the activities on
the victim rather than the effect of the actions on a victim's right to
privacy.
6. Harassment Statutes
It is a gross misdemeanor under Minnesota Statute section
609.747 for a person to commit more than one act of harassment
78. MINN. STAT. § 609.746 (West Supp. 1992).
Interference with privacy
Subdivision 1. Surreptitious intrusion. A person who enters upon an-
other's property and surreptitiously gazes, stares, or peeps in the win-
dow of a house or place of dwelling of another with intent to intrude
upon or interfere with the privacy of a member of the household is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Subd. 2. Intrusion on privacy. A person who, with the intent to harass,
abuse, or threaten another, repeatedly follows or pursues another after
being told not to do so by the person being followed or pursued, is guilty
of a misdemeanor. A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor if he:
(1) violates this subdivision within two years after a previous
conviction under this subdivision or section 609.224; or
(2) violates this subdivision against the same victim within five
years after a previous conviction under this subdivision or sec-
tion 609.224.
Subd. 3. Intrusion on privacy; aggravated violation. Whoever commits
an act described in subdivision 2 because of the victim's or another's
actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disabil-
ity .... age, or national origin, may be sentenced to imprisonment for
not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000,
or both.
79. MiNN. STAT. § 609.746 Subd. 2 (West Supp. 1992).
80. MiNN. STAT. § 609.746 Subd. 1 (West Supp. 1992).
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against the same individual within six consecutive months. 8 1 An
individual violates the statute by returning to the property of an-
other with the intent to harass, abuse, or threaten another, after
being told to leave the property and not to return.8 2 It is also a
gross misdemeanor for a person who has been convicted of assault
or terroristic threat to commit harassment against the same victim
within five consecutive years after the conviction or against any vic-
tim within two consecutive years after conviction.83 These provi-
sions appear to do no more than provide increased penalties for
actions prohibited by the above trespass, assault, and terroristic
threat statutes. However, the possibility of greater sentences and
fines may at least assist in efforts to deter stalkers.
A person who is the victim of harassment may seek a re-
straining order from the court under section 609.748 against a per-
son who makes "repeated, intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or
gestures that are intended to adversely affect her safety, security,
or privacy, regardless of the relationship between the actor and the
intended target."8 4 Violation of a TRO or a restraining order of
81. MINN. STAT. § 609.747 (West Supp. 1992).
Subdivision 1. Multiple acts of harassment. It is a gross misdemeanor
for a person to commit more than one act of harassment in violation of
section 609.605, subdivision 1, paragraph (b), clause (7), against the
same individual within six consecutive months. As used in this subdi-
vision, "individual" means a natural person.
Subd. 2. Harassment following assault or terroristic threat.
(a) It is a gross misdemeanor for a person who has been con-
victed of assault or terroristic threat to commit harassment:
(1) against the same victim, within five consecutive years
after the conviction; or
(2) against any victim, within two consecutive years after
the conviction.
(b) In this subdivision:
(1) "assault" means a violation of section 609.221,
609.222, 609.223, 609.2231, or 609.224;
(2) "harassment" means a violation of section 609.605,
subdivision 1, paragraph (b), clause (7); 609.746, subdivi-
sion 2; 609.79, subdivision 1, clause (1)(b); or 609.795, sub-
division 1, clause (3); and
(3) "terroristic threat" means a violation of 609.713, subdi-
vision 1 or 3.
82. MINN. STAT. § 609.747 Subd. 2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
83. MINN. STAT. § 609.747 Subd. 2(1) & (2) (West 1992).
84. MINN. STAT. § 609.748 (West Supp. 1992). Pertinent provisions are herein
outlined:
Subdivision 1. Definition. As used in this section, "harassment" means
repeated, intrusive, or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are in-
tended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another,
regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended
target.
Subd. 2. Restraining order; jurisdiction. A person who is a victim of
harassment may seek a restraining order from the district court in the
manner provided in this section. The parent or guardian of a minor
629
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which respondent has knowledge is a misdemeanor, punishable by
up to ninety days in prison, a fine of up to $700, or both.85 This
statute provides broader restraining order protection than the Do-
mestic Abuse Act because a petitioner may restrain persons beyond
those with whom they have or have had some type of familial rela-
tionship. Therefore, it is potentially more useful in deterring stalk-
ers than the Domestic Abuse Act.
"A person who, by means of a telephone, makes any comment,
request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, or lascivi-
ous" is guilty of a misdemeanor under Minnesota Statute section
609.79.86 It is also a misdemeanor for a person to "repeatedly make
telephone calls, whether or not conversation ensues, with the intent
who is a victim of harassment may seek a restraining order from the
juvenile court on behalf of the minor.
Subd. 4. Temporary restraining order.
(a) The court may issue a temporary restraining order ordering
the respondent to cease or avoid the harassment of another per-
son or to have no contact with that person if the petitioner files a
petition ... and if the court finds reasonable grounds to believe
that the respondent has engaged in harassment.
(c) The temporary restraining order is in effect until a hearing is
held on the issuance of a restraining order .... The court shall
hold the hearing on the issuance of a restraining order within 14
days after the temporary restraining order is issued unless (1)
the time period is extended upon written consent of the parties;
or (2) the time period is extended by the court for one additional
14-day period ....
Subd. 5. Restraining order.
(a) The court may grant a restraining order ordering the respon-
dent to cease or avoid the harassment of another person or to
have no contact with that person .... Relief granted by the re-
straining order must be for a fixed period of not more than two
years.
Subd. 6. Violation of restraining order.
(a) When a temporary restraining order or a restraining order is
granted under this section and the respondent knows of the or-
der, violation of the order is a misdemeanor.
Subd. 8. Notice. An order granted under this section must contain a
conspicuous notice to the respondent:
(1) of the specific conduct that will constitute a violation of
the order;
(2) that violation of an order is a misdemeanor punishable
by imprisonment for up to 90 days or a fine of up to $700 or
both; and
(3) that a peace officer must arrest without warrant and
take into custody a person if the peace officer has probable
cause to believe the person has violated a restraining
order.
85. MINN. STAT. § 609.748 Subd. 8(2) (West Supp 1992).
86. MINN. STAT. § 609.79 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
Subdivision 1. Whoever,
(1) By means of a telephone,
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to abuse, threaten or harass."8 7 Furthermore, a person having con-
trol of a telephone who knowingly permits it to be used for purposes
prohibited by this statute, is also guilty of a misdemeanor.8 8 Ag-
gravated violations, meaning those motivated by the victim's actual
or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, or disabil-
ity; or those committed while falsely impersonating another, may
be punished with up to one year in prison or a fine of up to $3,000,
or both.89 Also, section 609.795 makes it a misdemeanor to use the
mails or to deliver letters, telegrams, or packages with the intent to
abuse, disturb, or cause distress. 90 These statutes may be useful in
deterring persons who engage in activities that may upset victims.
They may also provide a method of dealing with stalkers before
their activities escalate to physical violence against a victim. How-
ever, where harassment is organized by particular groups against
specific targets and often involves violence, a statute specifically ad-
dressing such activities may be more effective against such
behavior.
(a) Makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal
which is obscene, lewd, or lascivious,
(b) Repeatedly makes telephone calls, whether or not con-
versation ensues, with intent to abuse, threaten, or
harass,
(c) Makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or
continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at
the called number, or
(2) Having control of a telephone, knowingly permits it to be
used for any purpose prohibited by this section, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.
Subd. la. Obscene or harassing telephone calls; aggravated violations.
(a) Whoever commits an act described in subdivision 1 because
of the victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, reli-
gion, sex, sexual orientation, disability,... age, or national origin
may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or
to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.
Subd. 2. The offenses may be prosecuted either at the place where the
call was made or where it is received.
87. MINN STAT. § 609.79 Subd. 1(1)(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
88. MINN STAT. § 609.79 Subd. 1(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
89. MINN STAT. § 609.79 Subd. la(a) & (b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
90. MINN. STAT. § 609.795 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
Subdivision 1. Misdemeanors. Whoever does any of the following is
guilty of a misdemeanor:
(1) knowing that the actor does not have the consent of either
the sender or the addressee, intentionally opens any sealed let-
ter, telegram, or package addressed to another; or
(2) knowing that a sealed letter, telegram, or package has been
opened without the consent of either the sender or addressee, in-
tentionally publishes any of the contents thereof; or
(3) with the intent to abuse, disturb, or cause distress, repeat-
edly uses the mails or delivers letters, telegrams, or packages.
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7. Prohibition on Obstructing Access
Some citizens and lawmakers have suggested that anti-stalk-
ing legislation be used to address the violence associated with anti-
abortion protests.9 1 In fact, an anti-stalking bill was introduced in
Congress in 1993 to make stalking a federal crime. 92 The bill was
proposed in order to offer protection to health care workers when
anti-abortion protesters follow and threaten them.93
Minnesota followed suit, passing a bill in 1993 that prohibits
physical interference with safe access to health care facilities.94
91. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 13.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. MiNN. STAT. § 609.7495 (West 1993).
Subdivision 1. Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the follow-
ing terms have the meanings given them.
(a) "Facility" means any of the following:
(1) a hospital or other health institution licensed under
sections 144.50 to 144.56;
(2) a medical facility as defined in section 144.561;
(3) an agency, clinic, or office operated under the direction
of or under contract with the commissioner of health or a
community health board, as defined in section 145A.02;
(4) a facility providing counseling regarding options for
medical services or recovery from an addiction;
(5) a facility providing emergency shelter services for bat-
tered women, as defined in section 611A.31, subdivision 3,
or a facility providing transitional housing for battered
women and their children;
(6) a residential care home or home as defined in section
144B.01, subdivision 5;
(7) a facility as defined in section 626.556, subdivision 2,
paragraph (f);
(8) a facility as defined in section 626.557, subdivision 2,
paragraph (a), where the services described in that para-
graph are provided;
(9) a place to or from which ambulance service, as defined
in section 144.801, is provided or sought to be provided;
and
(10) a hospice program licensed under section 144A.48.
(b) "Aggrieved party" means a person whose access to or egress
from a facility is obstructed in violation of subdivision 2, or the
facility.
Subd. 2. Obstructing access prohibited. A person is guilty of a gross
misdemeanor who intentionally and physically obstructs any individ-
ual's access to or egress from a facility.
Subd. 3. Not Applicable. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
imliair the right of any individual or group to engage in speech pro-
tected by the United States Constitution, the Minnesota Constitution,
or federal or state law, including but not limited to peaceful and lawful
handbilling and picketing.
Subd. 4. Civil Remedies.
(a) A party who is aggrieved by an act prohibited by this section,
or by an attempt or conspiracy to commit an act prohibited by
this section, may bring an action for damages, injunctive or de-
claratory relief, as appropriate, in district court against any per-
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Minnesota Statute section 609.7495 makes it a gross misdemeanor
for a person to "intentionally and physically obstruct an individual's
access to or egress from a health care facility."9 5 The law also pro-
vides for civil penalties, noting that an aggrieved party may bring
an action for damages, or for injunctive or declaratory relief against
any person or entity who has violated or conspired to violate the
statute.9 6 In apparent response to possible criticism that the law
infringes on the rights of protesters on either side of the abortion
issue, the Minnesota legislature prudently added a disclaimer to
the statute stating, "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to
impair the right of any individual or group to engage in speech pro-
tected by the United States Constitution, the Minnesota Constitu-
tion, or federal or state law, including but not limited to peaceful
and lawful handbilling and picketing."97 Although this statute
could be used to protect previously abused women from further
harm while seeking refuge at shelters for battered women, its main
purpose appears to be deterring violence committed by picketers
and protestors who threaten or harass health care workers or pa-
tients at women's clinics. Despite the statute's importance in deter-
ring violent acts by specific groups, its scope is too narrow to fully
address the crime of stalking, which needs to be more broadly ad-
dressed, as evidenced below.
III. Analysis of Minnesota's Anti-Stalking Statute
A. Minnesota's Anti-Stalking Legislation
Minnesota has felt the impact of stalking crimes, reporting nu-
merous tragic incidents. Pamela Sweeney had told friends that she
was being harassed by a co-worker, Joe Walsh, who had come to her
son or entity who has violated or has conspired to violate this
section.
(b) A party who prevails in a civil action under this subdivision
is entitled to recover from the violator damages, costs, attorney
fees, and other relief as determined by the court. In addition to
all other damages, the court may award to the aggrieved party a
civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation. If the aggrieved
party is a facility and the political subdivision where the viola-
tion occurred incurred law enforcement or prosecution expenses
in connection with the same violation, the court shall award any
civil penalty it imposes to the political subdivision instead of to
the facility.
(c) The remedies provided by this subdivision are in addition to
any other legal or equitable remedies the aggrieved party may
have and are not intended to diminish or substitute for those
remedies or to be exclusive.
95. MiNN. STAT. § 609.7495 Subd. 2 (West 1993).
96. MiNN. STAT. § 609.7495 Subd. 4 (West 1993).
97. Id.
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home uninvited, repeatedly drove by her home, and made harassing
phone calls to her.9 8 On May 31, 1991, Walsh entered Pamela's
home, using keys he had stolen from her desk, and killed her.9 9 In
another incident, while Marcia Palmer and her husband Jeffrey
were going through a nasty divorce, she made threats and repeated
calls to his new home. 10 0 He installed an elaborate security system
in his house in response to his wife's harassment.101 However, that
was not enough to stop Marcia, who knocked on her estranged hus-
band's door on Halloween night in 1992 wearing a black cape and a
monster mask, and shot and killed Jeffrey and his girlfriend when
he answered the door.102
Ramsey County Judge, Joanne Smith, has also been victim-
ized since 1984 by a man she sentenced to ninety days in jail for
assaulting a woman.1 0 3 Since then, she has encountered mutilated
animals on her porch and sidewalk, a fake bomb in her mailbox,
slashed automobile tires, spray-painted obscenities on her house,
and numerous obscene and hang-up phone calls.104 Proponents of
Minnesota's anti-stalking law cited these cases as evidence of the
state's need for such legislation.105
In May 1993, Governor Arne Carlson signed a bill making
stalking a crime in the state of Minnesota.106 Its terms encompass
98. Donna Halvorsen, Senate Panel Will Debate Stalking Bill But Crime is Diffi-





103. Joanne Smith, The Judge as Victim: She Tells her Own Story to Push Anti-
Stalking Bill, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), February 20, 1993, at 1A.
104. Id.; see also Donna Halvorsen, Victim's Campaign Pays Off in New Anti-
stalking Law, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), May 21, 1993, at 2B.
105. Halvorsen, supra note 104; see also Halvorsen, supra note 99.
106. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (West 1993).
Subd. 1. DEFINITION. As used in this section, "harass" means to en-
gage in intentional conduct in a manner that:
(1) would cause a reasonable person under the circumstances to
feel oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated; and
(2) causes this reaction on the part of the victim.
Subd. 2. HARASSMENT AND STALKING CRIMES. A person who ha-
rasses another by committing any of the following acts is guilty of a
gross misdemeanor:
(1) directly or indirectly manifests a purpose or intent to injure
the person, property, or rights of another by the commission of an
unlawful act;
(2) stalks, follows, or pursues another;
(3) returns to the property of another if the actor is without
claim of right to the property or consent of one with authority to
consent;
(4) repeatedly makes telephone calls, or induces a victim to
make telephone calls to the actor, whether or not conversation
ensues;
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(5) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or con-
tinuously to ring;
(6) repeatedly uses the mail or delivers or causes the delivery of
letters, telegrams, packages, or other objects; or
(7) engages in any other harassing conduct that interferes with
another person or intrudes on the person's privacy or liberty.
Subd. 3. AGGRAVATED VIOLATION. A person who commits any of
the following acts is guilty of a felony:
(1) commits any offense described in subdivision 2 because of the
victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, disability,... age, or national origin;
(2) commits any offense described in subdivision 2 by falsely im-
personating another;
(3) commits any offense described in subdivision 2 and possesses
a dangerous weapon at the time of the offense;
(4) commits a violation of subdivision 1 with intent to influence
or otherwise tamper with a juror or a judicial proceeding or with
intent to retaliate against a judicial officer .... or a prosecutor,
defense attorney, or officer of the court, because of that person's
performance of official duties in connection with a judicial pro-
ceeding; or
(5) commits any offense described in subdivision 2 against a vic-
tim under the age of 18, if the actor is more than 36 months older
than the victim.
Subd. 4. SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATIONS; FELONY. A
person is guilty of a felony who violates any provision of subdivision 2
within ten years after being discharged from sentence for a previous
conviction under this section; sections 609.221 to 609.224; 518B.01,
subdivision 14; 609.748, subdivision 6; or 609.713, subdivision 1, 3, or 4.
Subd. 5. PATTERN OF HARASSING CONDUCT.
(a) A person who engages in a pattern of harassing conduct with
respect to a single victim or one or more members of a single
household in a manner that would cause a reasonable person
under the circumstances to feel terrorized or to fear bodily harm
and that does cause this reaction on the part of the victim, is
guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than
$20,000, or both.
(b) For purposes of this subdivision, a "pattern of harassing con-
duct" means two or more acts within a five-year period that vio-
late the provisions of any of the following: (1) this section; (2)
§ 609.713; (3) § 609.224; (4) § 518B.01, subd. 14; (5) § 609.748,
subd. 6; (6) § 609.605, subd. 1, para. (a), clause (7); (7) § 609.79;
or (8) § 609.795
Subd. 6. MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT.
(a) When a person is convicted of a felony offense under this sec-
tion, or another felony offense arising out of a charge based on
this section, the court shall order an independent professional
mental health assessment of the offender's need for mental
health treatment. The court may waive the assessment if an ad-
equate assessment was conducted prior to the conviction.
(b) Notwithstanding section 13.42, 13.85, 144.335, or 260.161,
the assessor has access to the following private or confidential
data on the person if access is relevant and necessary for the
assessment:
(1) medical data under 13.42;
(2) welfare data under section 13.46;
(3) corrections and detention data under section 13.85;
(4) health records under section 144.355; and
(5) juvenile court records under section 260.161.
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many of the prohibitions in the criminal statutes above. 10 7 The one
new provision, however, specifically prohibits pursuing, following,
or stalking another person.' 0 8
The sanctions outlined in this new law appear to be tougher
than most of those in the criminal statutes above. For example,
here, the prohibited acts are charged at the outset as gross misde-
meanors instead of as misdemeanors.10 9 Also, aggravated viola-
tions, or second or subsequent violations result in a felony
conviction."l 0 Further, a person engaging in a pattern of harassing
conduct could be sentenced to up to ten years imprisonment or fined
up to $20,000, or both."' Most of the sentences or fines for the
criminal statutes described above are not as stringent for first time
offenses as those permissible under this statute. Also, a key provi-
sion of the anti-stalking statute is that it aims at a pattern of ter-
rorizing behavior not covered by existing Minnesota criminal
statutes which generally address single incidents.112
Although Minnesota's anti-stalking statute could be used as
an effective weapon against stalkers, recommendations of the Min-
nesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission could undermine the im-
pact of the new law."l 3 Initially, the Commission ranked felony
stalking at the second and third levels of the ten-level chart of
Data disclosed under this section may be used only for
purposes of the assessment and may not be further dis-
closed to any other person, except as authorized by law.
(c) If the assessment indicates that the offender is in need of and
amenable to mental health treatment, the court shall include in
the sentence a requirement that the offender undergo treatment.
(d) The court shall order the offender to pay the costs of assess-
ment under this subdivision unless the offender is indigent
under section 563.01.
Subd. 7. EXCEPTION. Conduct is not a crime under this section if it is
performed under terms of a valid license, to ensure compliance with a
court order, or to carry out a specific lawful commercial purpose or em-
ployment duty, is authorized or required by a valid contract, or is au-
thorized, required, or protected by state or federal law or the state or
federal constitutions.
Subdivision 2, clause (2), does not impair the right of any individual or
group to engage in speech protected by the federal constitution, the
state constitution, or federal or state law, including peaceful and lawful
handbilling and picketing.
107. MIm. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 2 (West 1993).
108. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 2(2) (West 1993).
109. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 2 (West 1993).
110. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 Subds. 3 & 4 (West 1993).
111. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 5 (West 1993).
112. Donna Halvorsen, Legislature OKs Bill to Fight Crime, Curb Guns, STAR
TiB. (MINNEAPOLIS), May 16, 1993, at lB.
113. Penalty Recommendations for Stalking Draw Fire, STAR TRI. (MINNEAPO-
LIS), July 22, 1993, at 2B.
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guidelines.ll4 This meant that only stalkers with long criminal
records would actually be imprisoned for violating the statute, and
even then, recommendations for imprisonment ranged from only
nineteen to twenty-five months.115 Convicted stalkers without
records might have received a few months in county jail and proba-
tion.116 Essentially, therefore, a felony violation of the anti-stalk-
ing law would have carried only the same penalties as theft of
$2,500 or less."i 7
Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge, R.A. Randall, was one of
the Commission members voting for lower penalties and stated that
"the crime [stalking] is virtually redundant."118 "When you have
the egregious case, there are plenty of laws to use.""l9 However, in
apparent response to concern expressed by the public, women's
groups, Minnesota's Lieutenant Governor, Joanell Dyrstad, and the
state's Attorney General, Hubert Humphrey III, the Commission
decided to review its decision.120
Although the Commission subsequently decided to raise felony
stalking to levels four and five on the sentencing guidelines chart,
some observers, including Lieutenant Governor Dyrstad, and Min-
nesota Supreme Court Justice, Sandra Gardebring were still disap-
pointed.121 Now, for example, offenses such as repeated phone calls
may be punished similarly to such crimes as third-degree assault
and motor vehicle theft, and the penalty for harassing conduct that
causes terror may be punished similarly to the crime of residential
burglary or simple robbery.12 2
Justice Gardebring, a member of the Commission, thought
that no sentencing guidelines should be set because of "the broad
language of the statute and the varieties of behavior" which might
be prohibited by it.123 Lieutenant Governor Dyrstad also thought
that sentencing under the law should be left to a judge's discretion
for at least a year to get a clearer understanding of the statute's




117. Stalking Sentences Will Be Reconsidered, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS), August
25, 1993, at 6B.
118. Penalty Recommendations, supra note 113, at 2B.
119. Id.
120. Stalking Sentences, supra note 117, at 6B.
121. Kevin Duchschere, Sentencing Commission Urges Stiffer Stalking Penalties:
Under Changes Violators Would Be More Likely to Serve Time, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAP-





that stalking crimes should be unranked because simply raising the
penalties slightly could cause more debate and mistrust of the sys-
tem without actually responding to the public's demand for stiffer
sanctions.1 25 However, Commission members disagreed with those
opinions, expressing concern that providing no guidelines would
amount to the Commission shirking the responsibility to protect
those convicted under the statute from widely varying sentences
imposed by judges with unlimited sentencing discretion.126 Unfor-
tunately, the reality is that if judges believe that longer sentences
are justified, they ultimately have the option of departing from the
Commission's sentencing guidelines recommendations. 127
B. Constitutional and Procedural Issues Regarding
Minnesota's Anti-Stalking Statute
1. First Amendment Questions
The First Amendment guarantees an individual's freedom of
speech and expression.128 However, it is well understood that the
right of speech is not absolute at all times and in all circum-
stances.' 2 9 The crime of stalking typically involves repeatedly
threatening another person by harassing phone calls or written
messages.' 30 The government has a compelling interest in preserv-
ing the peace, in protecting each person from crime, and from fear
of crime.' 31 Hence, threats of violence appropriately fall outside of
First Amendment protection, because people must be protected
from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders,
and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. 13 2
Still, states must be careful to construct their anti-stalking laws so
as to avoid having them declared invalid because they violate the
First Amendment.
St. Paul Police Chief, William Finney, said he thinks that
Minnesota's new anti-stalking law will give police a way to deal
with people who "have been frustrating law enforcement efforts for
many, many years." 3 3 But William Roath, Executive Director of




128. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
129. Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942) (holding
that lewd, obscene, profane, libelous and insulting language is no essential part of
any exposition of ideas and, therefore, is not protected by the First Amendment).
130. Beck et al., supra note 5, at 60.
131. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 458 N.W.2d 807, 809 (1992).
132. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992).
133. Halvorsen, supra note 104, at 2B.
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in other states have been challenged as vague and too broad, saying
that the problem is that most of the anti-stalking laws make crimes
out of things that are generally legal.134 Minnesota's anti-stalking
statute, however, prohibits acts that are already sanctioned under
other Minnesota criminal statutes.135 Also, the statutory excep-
tions to the conduct prohibited by the statute may protect it from
invalidation by the courts.13 6 The terms of the statute note under
what circumstances some acts prohibited by the law are permissi-
ble.13 7 For example, under the statute, otherwise prohibited con-
duct is not a crime if it is performed under terms of a valid license,
to ensure compliance with a court order, to carry out a specific law-
ful commercial purpose or employment duty, or if it is authorized or
required by a valid contract. 138 The law also specifically states that
its terms do not impair the right to engage in speech protected by
the federal constitution, the state constitution, or federal or state
law, including peaceful and lawful handbilling and picketing.139
2. Vagueness
In order to be constitutional, a criminal statute must be suffi-
ciently definite to give notice of its prohibited conduct to a person
who intends to avoid its penalties and to guide the judge and de-
fense attorney in the law's application.140 Essentially, the terms of
a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit
to give "fair notice" of what acts are punishable.141 The point is to
lessen the possibility that a citizen could possibly violate a statute
without knowing that he is committing a crime and without in-
tending to do so.
Stalking behavior can include repeatedly following an
individual or showing up at the targeted person's home or work
134. Halvorsen, supra note 98, at lB.
135. MIN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 2 (West 1993).
136. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 2 (West 1993).
137. Id.
138. MIN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 7 (West 1993).
139. Id.
140. Hawaii v. Marley, 509 P.2d 1095, 1103 (1973). In Marley, the Hawaii
supreme court held constitutional a statute which prohibited entering or remaining
"in or upon the dwelling house, buildings, or improved or cultivated lands of another
or the land of another about or near any of its buildings used for dwelling purposes,
after having been forbidden to do so by the person who has lawful control of such
premises, either directly or by notice posted thereon." Id. The court said the statute
was not unconstitutionally vague, indefinite or overbroad on its face, and that the
law provided adequate notice of potential criminal liability. Id.
141. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,391 (1926) (affirming the
imposition of a decree to enjoin the Oklahoma Commissioner of Labor from enforcing
a statute that did not inform those subject to it of what conduct would render them
liable for its penalties).
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place.14 2 A major concern regarding anti-stalking laws is whether
they may curtail some perfectly legitimate activities involving going
to certain places repeatedly.143 For example, an overbroad statute
could make it a criminal offense for an investigative reporter to pur-
sue the subject of a report.144 It might also prevent a concerned
father, unfairly denied visitation rights, from watching his children
from a distance to make sure that they are safe.14 5 The delicate
balance for legislators drafting anti-stalking laws is to provide the
most effective statutory tools against criminal behavior while im-
posing as little as possible upon the lives of law-abiding people.
Even though citizens are concerned about crime and their own per-
sonal safety, people generally will not tolerate an infringement
upon their guaranteed rights.
If a statute is so vague and indefinite in its form and as inter-
preted, that it would permit the punishment of protected activities,
it is void on its face, as contrary to the 14th Amendment. 146 No
matter how well intentioned a law may be, interpreting courts must
not enforce its terms if they are contrary to the Constitution.
Therefore, each state faces the challenge of ensuring that its stat-
ute's terms and plausible interpretations do not infringe upon the
liberty interests of one person in order to protect the rights of an-
other. To rush through a law that likely will not hold up in court
does a disservice to those stalking victims whom the laws are in-
tended to protect.' 4 7
Opponents of the Minnesota anti-stalking statute might argue
that it is unconstitutionally vague, giving police officers too much
discretion to decide which suspects are or are not in violation of the
law based on a subjective evaluation of the acts committed. The
danger of bias and prejudice affecting officers' judgment is a very
legitimate concern. However, the chances of biased application of
Minnesota's anti-stalking law are probably limited because of the
terms and construction of the statute. Because the acts prohibited
are not identified by broad, general descriptions, and are instead
set out by list, the discretion of law enforcers is appropriately lim-
ited. Either a suspect's actions fit the law's prohibitions-con-
142. Beck et al., supra note 5, at 60.
143. 138 CONG. REc., supra note 21.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 506, 509 (1948) (reversing the conviction of a
person charged with having in his possession, with the intent to sell, certain
magazines because the statute under which he was charged failed to give fair notice
of what acts were punishable and because it included prohibitions against constitu-
tionally protected expressions).
147. 138 CONG. REC., supra note 21.
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cretely defined acts-or they do not. This way, there is not much
room for subjective interpretation by individual police officers. List-
ing is also a way to ensure that the average citizen understands
what actions are sanctioned, so as to give him fair warning.14 8 The
definitions of the prohibited acts are also straightforward, with
commonly used terms, so as to avoid misunderstandings about
what activities constitute a crime under the statute. 14 9
3. Warrant Requirements
A police officer may lawfully arrest a person without a warrant
when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has
occurred and that the person apprehended committed it.150 An of-
ficer may also make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor com-
mitted in the officer's presence, meaning that the officer is aware of
the commission of the crime through any of his or her senses. 15 1 To
avoid constitutional challenges based on the allowance of warrant-
less arrests for gross misdemeanors committed under the anti-
stalking statute but not in the presence of law enforcement officers,
the Minnesota legislature wisely did not include such a provi-
sion.152 Because actions usually involved in stalking, such as tire
slashings and phone harassment, are misdemeanors, police must
witness them to make a warrantless arrest.153 Since police will not
likely gain independent knowledge of stalkers' activities, stalking
victims must report incidents to assist police in establishing arrest
probable cause, and also to establish that the suspect is engaging in
a pattern of prohibited conduct. To make an arrest for a felony
charge under the anti-stalking law, an officer also must still have
probable cause, or knowledge based on reasonable and trustworthy
facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent
person to believe that the suspect committed or is committing a
crime.' 5 4 Leaving out a constitutionally questionable warrantless
arrest provision is another way Minnesota legislators may have en-
148. Hawaii v. Marley, 509 P.2d, at 1103; see also M-NN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 2
(West 1993).
149. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
150. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-81 (1963) (reversing defend-
ant's conviction on narcotics charges because the information on which the officers
acted in arresting him without a warrant did not constitute probable cause).
151. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925) (establishing probable
cause arrest where police, on information received, anticipated cars carrying prohib-
ited liquor, and defendants came through on the highway, carrying liquor).
152. MINN. STAT. § 609.749 (West 1993).
153. Halvorsen, supra note 112, at lB.
154. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (reversing defendant's convic-
tion for possession of illegal contraband because officers arrested him based on a
picture of him and knowledge that he had a record of similar prior convictions, with-
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sured that the law will survive judicial scrutiny. However, the ef-
fectiveness of the law will necessarily be measured by the
willingness of stalking victims to report the crime.
4. Intent
Minnesota state senator, Pat McGowan stated that under
Minnesota's anti-stalking law, prosecutors will not have to prove
that a stalker intended to harass a victim.155 The statute only re-
quires proof that the stalker's behavior would cause a reasonable
person to feel oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated. 156 The statute
says that purpose or intent to injure a person, property, or rights of
another may be manifested directly or indirectly. 157 One might un-
derstand the senator's statement in conjunction with the terms of
the statute to mean that the victim's demonstrated reasonable feel-
ing of oppression, persecution, or intimidation is enough proof of
the stalker's intent in committing the act. If this interpretation
proves viable, the statute should survive a constitutional challenge
to the statute's intent requirements.
C. A Brief Comparison of the California and Minnesota
Statutes
The construction of the Minnesota statute may make it less
susceptible to constitutional challenges and possible invalidation.
Unlike California's pioneer legislation, Minnesota's statute lists
specific acts that are prohibited by the statute 58 This conduct is
sanctioned by other criminal statutes that do not face constitutional
challenges. Listing is recommended against as "exclusive," by the
NIJ report submitted to Congress.159 However, while naming the
acts that constitute prohibited stalking behavior may appear to
narrow the law's scope too much, this approach may be what makes
its invalidation less likely.
Critics of California's anti-stalking law have raised questions
of whether it provides adequate notice of what the law prohibits.160
A major concern is that illegal behavior will be indistinguishable
from legal behavior, possibly subjecting innocent or incompetent
out having heard or seen anything else to give them grounds for belief that defend-
ant had acted or was then acting unlawfully).
155. Halvorsen, supra note 112, at lB.
156. Id.
157. MiNN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 2 (West 1993).
158. Id.
159. 139 CONG. REC., supra note 25.
160. Schuyler, supra note 6, at 20.
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people to criminal penalties. 1 61 The California statute states that
conduct during labor picketing is not covered by the statute.162 It
also points out that the harassing conduct prohibited by the law is
that which serves no legitimate purpose.163 However, it does not
give explicit notice as to what is or is not a legitimate purpose.16 4
In contrast, by outlining exceptions to the statute, Minnesota's anti-
stalking law gives clear notice as to when the statute applies.16 5 It
also expressly states that the law does not infringe upon constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights.166
The construction of the Minnesota statute may also better as-
sist prosecutors in obtaining convictions for stalking. The Minne-
sota law does not require "credible threat," which is required by the
California law.16 7 Neither does the Minnesota statute require a
reasonable fear for safety.16 8 Under Minnesota's provisions, a pros-
ecutor would not have to show that the suspect possessed the actual
or apparent ability to carry out the threat. 169 The requirement, in-
stead, is that a reasonable person under the circumstances would
feel oppressed, persecuted or intimidated by the suspect's con-
duct.17o Here, proof of what the victim suffered and how objectively
reasonable that suffering is, in terms of the suspect's conduct, is
more critical for a conviction than whether the suspect could have
carried out his threat-whether that determination is objective or
subjective. Although the California law may have provided the
Minnesota legislature with a valuable reference while drafting the
state's anti-stalking statute, in choosing alternative terms and con-
struction, the Minnesota lawmakers may have better insured the
availability of this tool to directly combat the crime of stalking.
D. Impact of the Statute
At least seven people have been charged under Minnesota's
new anti-stalking law since its passage in 1993. These people in-
clude a man obsessed with a convenience store worker who was ar-
rested after he allegedly returned repeatedly to the store to ask her
out, parked near the store and stared at her, and told her that he
was not afraid of the police and that they could do nothing to
161. Id.
162. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. MiNN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 7 (West 1993).
166. Id.
167. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (West Supp. 1993).
168. Id.
169. MiNN. STAT. § 609.749 (West 1993).
170. Id.
Law and Inequality
him. 171 Four abortion rights activists were also charged under the
law for allegedly trailing an "Operation Rescue" caravan en route to
the homes of two doctors who perform abortions.172 Further, a man
who had been a resident of a mental health facility where he first
met one of its employees was charged under the anti-stalking law
for allegedly writing and telephoning her after she indicated to him
that his attentions were unwanted. 173 Finally, an "Operation Res-
cue" trainee, was charged under the law for allegedly following an
abortion clinic security guard several times from his home.174
In December 1993, Minnesota District Court Judge, E. Anne
McKinsey denied a motion to declare Minnesota Statute section
609.749 and its subdivisions unconstitutional, holding that facial
overbreadth and vagueness challenges to the anti-stalking law
must fail.175 Five cases, including the first and last incidents de-
scribed above, were consolidated for argument and consideration of
the common issue of defendants' constitutional challenge to the
statute.17 6
In response to the overbreadth challenge, Judge McKinsey ex-
plained that a review of the pertinent provisions of the statute
makes it clear that the focus of the law is upon conduct, not pro-
tected expression.' 77 By its terms, she noted, the statute defines
"harassment" as intentional "conduct" that oppresses, persecutes,
or intimidates another.s78 Judge McKinsey ruled that the law's
prohibition of persons from "targeting" individuals (or households)
in a harassing manner, so as to cause the victims to feel oppressed,
persecuted, or intimidated, is a permissible regulation of conduct,
171. Tatsha Robertson, Minneapolis Man Charged Under Anti-Stalking Law, Po-
lice Say He Ignored Warnings to Leave Store Clerk Alone, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS),
June 10, 1993, at lB.
172. Kurt Chandler, Four Abortion Rights Activists Charged Under Anti-Stalking
Law, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS) Aug. 26, 1993, at 1B; see also Maureen M. Smith, 4
Abortion Rights Volunteers Arrested Under State's New Anti-Stalking Law, STAR
TRiB. (MINNEAPOLIS) July 12, 1993, at 5A.
173. Associated Press, St. Paul Man Charged with Stalking Woman, STAR TRiB.
(MmNAPOLIS), August 13, 1993, at 2B.
174. Maureen M. Smith, Operation Rescue Trainee Arrested, Clinic Guard was
Allegedly Stalked, STAR Thus., (MINNEAPOLIS) June 26, 1993, at 1B; see also Maureen
M. Smith, Operation Rescue Trainee in Court, May be Charged Under State's New
Anti-Stalking Law, STAR ThIB., (MINNEAPOLIS) June 29, 1993, at 2B.
175. State v. Davis, No. 93-042334, slip op. at 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th J.Dist. Dec. 7,
1993).
176. Id. at 2. Defendants adopted one another's written and oral arguments, and
state prosecutors adopted one another's arguments. Id.
177. Id. at 9 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984),
"violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special
harms distinct from their communicative impact.., are entitled to no constitutional
protection.").
178. Id. at 12,
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regardless of the intended message. 179 She further found that even
though it is possible to imagine that the statute may prohibit some
lawful conduct, such hypothetical situations, in and of themselves,
will not render the entire statute void and unenforceable.180 And
since defendants in this case could not identify any conduct pro-
tected under the First Amendment which the statute purports to
regulate, she concluded that their overbreadth challenge must
fail.181
Judge McKinsey also noted that subdivision 7 removes any
doubt regarding the law's permissible application.182 The inclusion
of the subdivision, she determined, is neither an admission of the
statute's overbreadth, nor a violation of separation of powers, inter-
fering with judicial function.183 In her view, subdivision 7 is a le-
gitimate legislative enactment setting forth the parameters of the
statute. 184
Addressing the vagueness challenge, Judge McKinsey con-
cluded that, as required,185 ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited by Minnesota's anti-stalking law and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement.' 8 6 Relating to the first requirement, she determined
that the omission of specific intent or motive in the definition of
"harassment" was deliberate and necessary to effectuate the pur-
pose of the statute because although a stalker's actual "intent" may
be amorous, for example, its effect on the victim, according to the
"reasonable person" standard, may be terror.' 8 7 Moreover, she
said, the statute does require "scienter," insofar as it provides that
"harassment" means to engage in "intentional conduct" causing the
victim reasonably to feel "oppressed."188 Thus, while the defendant
may not intend the victim's actual reaction, the conduct causing the
reaction is intended.189
Judge McKinsey also determined that the definition of "har-
ass" is not vague in its description of the effect upon the victim be-
cause the statute provides that conduct must be measured against
179. Id. at 13.
180. Id. at 13-14.
181. Id. at 14 (quoting City of Mankato v. Fetchenhier, 363 N.W.2d 76, 78 (1985);
accord State v. Andersen, 370 N.W.2d 653, 662 (1985)).
182. Id. at 15.
183. Id. at 15 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 325-26 (1987), "such a 'saving
clause' was at least tacitly approved by the Supreme Court").
184. Id. at 16.
185. Id. at 17-18 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
186. Id. at 26.





a "reasonable person" standard, while also requiring that the victim
actually feel "oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated."19 0 These
terms, she said, have commonly understood meanings suggesting a
degree of interference with another person's privacy, liberty, and
security which is greater than mere annoyance or irritation.19 1
Judge McKinsey further noted that "stalk," has common usage in
everyday speech, "connot[ing] a particular kind of conduct readily
understood by anyone exposed to contemporary media, while "fol-
low" and "pursue," when read together in context with "stalk[ing]"
provide an "'ascertainable standard of guilt' sufficient to enable
persons of ordinary intelligence to avoid conduct which the law for-
bids."192 Also, "pattern," she said, has a precise meaning set forth
in subdivision 5.193 Therefore, she concluded, the statute contains
articulable and objective standards for fair notice and
enforcement. 194
In regard to the second requirement to overcome a vagueness
challenge, Judge McKinsey determined that Minnesota's anti-stalk-
ing statute does not foster arbitrary or discriminatory enforce-
ment.195  With its list of content-neutral acts comprising
impermissible harassment and the requirement that the harass-
ment must be intimidating, oppressing, or persecuting to a reason-
able person and must cause such reaction in the actual victim, she
said, the statute contains adequate guidance to law enforcement
personnel to ensure fair and nondiscriminatory enforcement.196
Unfortunately, even if the Minnesota anti-stalking law is not
subsequently declared unconstitutional and invalid at the appellate
or state supreme court level, and even considering the somewhat
stiffer penalties proposed by the Minnesota Sentencing Commis-
sion, the statute still may not deter or do much for most stalkers,
ninety percent of whom research suggests are mentally ill. 197 Stan-
ton Samenow, a clinical psychologist and author of "Inside the
Criminal Mind," says that many stalkers have disturbed self
images in which they see themselves as irresistible or complete ze-
ros.198 When they are rejected, they resort to intimidation in a des-
perate attempt to try to regain self-esteem. 199 If researchers are
190. Id. at 21-22.
191. Id. at 22.
192. Id. at 23 (quoting State v Christensen, 439 N.W.2d 391).
193. Id. at 24; see also MINN. STAT. § 609.749 Subd. 5(b) (West 1993).
194. Id. at 26.
195. Id. at 25.
196. Id. at 26.
197. Puente, supra note 7, at 9A.
198. Beck, et al., supra note 5, at 61.
199. Id.
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correct in their analyses of typical stalkers, it might appear that to
enact anti-stalking statutes and impose stiff penalties for the crime
is useless or even unfair. However, legislators must ensure that
police and prosecutors have a means to deal with criminals who
knowingly and intentionally terrorize others. Furthermore, where
anti-stalking laws such as Minnesota's provide for mental health
assessments and treatment, the lawmakers not only protect stalk-
ing victims, but also provide psychiatric help for convicted stalkers
who should be held responsible and punished for the crime.
There is also concern that some Minnesota citizens might get
a false sense of security from a stalking law.200 While the law's
purpose is to stop obsessive behavior, it could trigger violent behav-
ior, especially after the offender is arrested and released on bail.201
The threat of prison may deter some stalkers, but for others, it is
like putting fuel on a fire.2 0 2 Suspects arrested under Minnesota's
anti-stalking statute might retaliate against their victims, but the
alternative is to permit them to continue their terroristic behavior
unchecked. Although the law cannot be expected to be a cure-all,
Minnesota's anti-stalking statute can at least give Minnesotans
confidence that steps have been taken to protect them from the tyr-
anny of others. Judge Smith acknowledged that stalking victims
can never be given back their sense of security, but the state's new
anti-stalking law makes it clear that stalking is a crime that will be
taken seriously by police, prosecutors, and judges.20 3 The message
to victims, she said, is hope.2 04
Conclusion
Although critics of the Minnesota anti-stalking statute may
characterize it as simply a conglomeration of acts already prohib-
ited by other criminal statutes, it can be useful to prosecutors, law
enforcement officers, and stalking victims. A major benefit is that it
consolidates a variety of conduct associated with stalking. This will
relieve all parties of the onerous task of figuring out what criminal
statute or series of statutes might be applicable in each case of al-
leged stalking. At the least, this new statute acknowledges that
stalking is a distinctive crime that should be explicitly sanctioned.
Ideally, it will deter or punish stalkers who have escaped prosecu-
tion because no other Minnesota statute directly addressed the
crime.
200. Halvorsen, supra note 98, at lB.
201. Id.
202. Beck et al., supra note 5, at 61.
203. Halvorsen, supra note 104, at 2B.
204. Id.
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